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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the costs of forming a monetary union among the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries by looking at economic linkages within the GCC, and between the 
GCC and the potential anchors (the US, and major European countries such as France, 
Germany and Italy) for their proposed new currency. We investigate the importance of the 
US dollar compared to the Euro by focusing on aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply 
(AS) shock symmetry across these countries.  We differentiated between oil and non-oil 
sector by estimating structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models with a combination of 
variables: oil output, non-oil output, total output, nominal/real price of oil and overall price 
level. One set of models was identified with the long-run restrictions of Blanchard and Quah 
(1989), whereas the set that assesses the robustness of the findings was estimated with the 
short-run restrictions of Sims (1992). We find overwhelming support for AD shock symmetry 
across the GCC countries and between the GCC and the US, but none for the major European 
countries with the GCC. Non-oil AS shocks are mostly asymmetric, but oil AS shocks are 
mostly symmetric when the real price of oil is included.  This agrees with the view that GCC 
countries are subjected to common oil shocks. It also suggests that previous VAR models 
estimated to pass judgment on the feasibility of monetary union across GCC countries may 
have suffered from problems of mis-specification if the real price of oil was not . We surmise 
that the US dollar is a better anchor candidate for anchoring the new  GCC currency than the 
Euro, since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in these countries. 
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Monetary union between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the choice of 
an anchor for their proposed new currency: Does the symmetry of shocks extend to the 
non-oil sector? 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The materialization of the European monetary union (EU) has given impetus to many 
countries or regional blocs to pursue further economic integration to emulate the successes of 
the European countries. A seamless example is that of the GCC countries,1 which, starting in 
the early 1980s, embarked on a path towards monetary union, despite the tumultuous 
surrounding political environment of the Middle East and North Africa region. This decision 
was justified on a number of grounds. With the exception of Bahrain, these countries are 
mainly endowed with oil and gas, which constitutes a large portion of their exports, and they 
are all tied by cultural affinities – the same religion, the same language and a common history 
(see Balli et al. (2009) and Khan (2009) for a discussion). These attributes place the GCC in 
an even better position to pursue further economic integration than the initiators of the EU. 
Progress in terms of trade openness, factor mobility and labor market adjustments has been 
made towards a common currency at a faster pace than most unions. According to Khan ( 
2009) and Berengaut and Elborgh-Woytek (2006), the GCC has already met the criteria for a 
single currency among its members when factors such as proximity, size, output fluctuation, 
trade structure, inflation performance, and ongoing harmonization and regulation of the 
banking system are taken into consideration. However, although these generally accepted 
prerequisite conditions have been met,  issues surrounding  the choice of an appropriate 
anchor for the proposed new currency still remain unresolved. This is despite (a) the long 
history of their national currencies being pegged to the US dollar, though Kuwait and Oman 
                                                 
1 The GCC bloc is composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). 
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have been officially, but not in reality, in and out of the dollar shelter; and (b) the US dollar 
being the accepted currency for settling oil transactions in the international market, and oil 
represents a large share of each country’s total exports, save for Bahrain.  
 
The process of diversification that has taken place in the GCC to make them less reliant on 
oil has given rise to a growing non-oil sector, financed mostly with export revenues from the 
oil sector. An interdependent linkage has emerged between the two sectors, since the oil 
sector revenues fuel the non-oil sector, and increasing demand for energy from the non-oil 
sector added to foreign demand also puts pressure on the price of oil to rise, thereby inducing 
a surge in oil supplies. This holds even though the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), to which the GCC pertains, has the power to and often does inhibit overall 
supplies to maximize revenues.  This dichotomization of the GCC economy that has taken 
place over time posits quite an interesting dynamic when it comes to analyzing the 
commonality (or lack thereof) of the GCC’s responses to macroeconomic shocks in their 
quest for monetary union. In assessing the potential cost of forming a GCC monetary union 
purely on the basis of macroeconomic shocks, ceteris paribus, should one solely focus on 
overall demand and supply shocks? Or on overall demand, oil-supply shock, and non-oil 
supply shock? Or just on overall demand and non-oil supply shocks, since it is a common 
belief that oil shocks have similar effects on the member countries due to the nature of their 
economies? In this paper, we tackle these questions at length by first considering the common 
belief, then by performing robustness tests based on the other alternatives while factoring in 
the effect of the nominal the real oil prices.  
 
In a few words, we provide answers to two key empirical questions. To what extent does the 
non-oil sector of the GCC countries satisfy the prerequisite of common shocks for monetary 
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union?2 More precisely, does the degree of shock symmetry or asymmetry between these 
countries and the United States (US) and the three major countries of the EU (namely France, 
Germany and Italy) warrant the choice of the US dollar, the Euro or a combination of the two 
as the anchor for the newly proposed single currency? Essentially, we are keen to explore 
whether the growing importance of the non-oil sector for these economies is likely to impose 
substantial adjustment costs if their responses to these shocks are not synchronized, and if the 
benefits of joining the union such as lower transaction costs, reduction in exchange rate risk, 
equalization of interest rates, decline in relative price variability and increase in production 
efficiency do not outweigh those costs (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 
1994, 1997)    
 
Of course, the motivation of this paper primarily stems from the imminent signing of a 
monetary union by the GCC countries and the issuing of a single currency, which was 
initially slated to be pegged to the US dollar. Unfortunately, rising government debts in the 
US, along with the recent decline in the value of the dollar relative to the Euro and other 
major currencies such as the Chinese Renminbi, have sparked a debate on the choice and 
suitability of the Dollar as a solid anchor for the GCC’s proposed new currency. In summary, 
we are very interested in determining how suitable an alternative the Euro or a basket of 
currencies could be for these countries.  
 
A vast amount of literature on the choice of exchange rate regimes and on the dollarization of 
economies has developed following the seminal paper of Mundell (1961) on an optimum 
currency area (OCA) along with subsequent works by McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), and 
Tower and Willet (1976), to cite just a few. Much of this literature focuses on  the importance 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that the government of Oman has officially pulled out of the monetary union initiative in 
2007 due to their inability to meet inflation targets, and the UAE has recently followed suit because of 
disagreements on the location of the new Central Bank of the Union. 
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of relative economic sizes, labor mobility, the degree of openness, trade concentration, 
similarity of shocks and cycles, and, finally, the system of risk-sharing for assessing the 
suitability of fixed, flexible exchange rate regimes and prospective monetary unions (see 
surveys by Tavlas (1992) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997)). Out of all these criteria, the 
degree of symmetry between shocks across countries is considered to be the basic 
prerequisite and therefore has received much attention empirically. According to this line of 
research, one needs only to determine whether the aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate 
supply (AS) shocks are correlated across interested member countries to draw conclusions on 
the aptness of monetary union. However, Frankel and Rose (1998) have shown that a 
similarity of response to shocks or similar business cycles provides a misleading picture of a 
country’s suitability for entry into a currency union, because the OCA criteria, namely 
international trade patterns and international business cycle correlations, are endogenous. In 
their view, the endogeneity arises as a result of specialization. As tariff and nontariff barriers 
are removed, international trade is fomented and countries reallocate their resources towards 
industries in which they have comparative advantage, thereby exposing themselves to more 
asymmetric shocks. According to Frankel and Rose, it is quite possible that countries that 
enter a monetary union because of the similarity in business cycles, ceteris paribus, may 
likely to find that they experience different business cycles once in the union than before. In 
their view, closer international trade may also result in tighter correlations of national 
business cycles if demand shocks prevail or if intra-industry trade, as a share of total trade, is 
substantially greater than other trade shares. It is worth noting that Frankel and Rose believe 
that the latter case is the more realistic one.   
 
Without denying the importance of the contribution of Frankel and Rose and the multitude of 
papers that tests their hypothesis (Frankel, 1999; Eichengreen, 2000; Kenen, 2000; Hughes-
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Hallett and Pisitelli, 2001; Kose and Yi, 2001, to cite just a few),  our main focus in this 
paper is not to investigate the endogeneity of the OCA criteria for the GCC countries but to 
rater explore the traditional view of Mundell (1961) that the more highly correlated the 
business cycles of countries, the more suitable they are for monetary union endeavor, ceteris 
paribus. In this vein, the approach taken in this paper is comprehensive in that not only do we 
test for symmetry between the GCC member countries, but we also investigate whether 
shocks are synchronized between the GCC countries and their strategic and/or trading 
partners in assessing the suitability of either the US dollar or the Euro as the principal anchor 
for the newly proposed GCC currency.  
 
As can be gleaned from the literature, the debate surrounding the aptness of a fixed or 
floating exchange rate regime as a principal macroeconomic policy is still unsettled. As 
taught in any standard macroeconomic or international economics course, under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, a country cannot have an open capital market and an independent 
monetary policy at the same time. The ensuing costs include, but are not limited to, foregone 
potential seigniorage revenues and an inability to respond to asymmetric shocks. On the other 
hand, under flexible exchange rate regimes, studies have shown that countries tend to 
experience higher inflation and lower growth rates but are better able to absorb economic 
shocks through open capital markets, as the conduct of monetary policy rests with their 
central banks. Although, theoretically, there is no universally accepted “optimal” exchange 
rate regime, the theory of OCA is unequivocal on its prescriptions in relation to the 
appropriateness of exchange rate regimes. This theory postulates that economies that are 
subjected to idiosyncratic shocks are better off in adopting or operating under a flexible 
exchange rate, since this policy enables them to retain monetary policy independence. 
Correspondingly, those economies that are subjected to symmetric shocks may pursue  a 
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fixed exchange rate system. Against this background, one may argue that it is the symmetry 
of shocks that dictates the appropriate anchor of choice for these countries.  
 
Ever since Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) used the growth of output and prices to extract 
structural AD and AS shocks, various studies on monetary integration have followed similar 
paths to assess the feasibility of monetary union among countries. We follow a similar 
approach in this paper by concentrating on the growth rates of oil and non-oil output/total 
output and prices while modeling both the nominal and the real oil prices. We have a number 
of reasons for taking this route. First, for the GCC as a group, the oil sector contributes about 
46% on average of total output while the non-oil sector contributes the remaining 54%. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to take at face value the common belief that these economies are 
already subjected to symmetric shocks in the oil sector, which partly corroborates the 
formation of a common currency among these countries and, correspondingly, the adoption 
of the US dollar as the anchor currency. Second, since the price of oil is quoted and traded in 
US dollars in the international market, it is unsurprising that the economies of these countries 
react homogeneously to shocks tributary to the oil sector regardless of the origin of the 
shocks. Third, it is truism that the GCC governments have succeeded in their efforts to 
diversify their economies by substantially reducing their reliance on the oil sector as the 
prime mover of economic growth in the non-oil sector, particularly in sectors such as 
infrastructure, tourism, construction and real estate, and other services. However, these 
investments have not taken place at the same pace and same magnitude, and labor market 
conditions vary across member countries, though they all import labor.3 
 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that labor mobility may not fulfill the role of a shock absorber for the GCC countries as 
it does for other countries because only nationals of the economic bloc are granted such freedom. Except for 
Saudi Arabia, the numbers of nationals in the GCC countries are, on average, smaller than the number of foreign 
workers who potentially suffer from unemployment. 
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Given that the GCC countries have initially expressed their will to peg the new currency to 
the US dollar, and recognizing that US monetary policy already influences the price of oil in 
the international market through the linkages between monetary and foreign exchange 
markets, it makes sense to investigate whether shocks affecting the GCC non-oil sector are 
similar in nature to shocks affecting the US. After all, it is monetary policy from the US that 
will have the major impact on non-oil output and prices in the GCC countries as an economic 
bloc, since the US has the largest economy in the world. We also recognize that our analysis 
would be incomplete if we did not incorporate the growing importance of the EU into the 
picture. To that end, we also investigated whether the GCC countries and the core European 
countries are subjected to similar macroeconomic shocks in order to justify the suitability of 
the Euro as an alternative anchor.  
 
Holding constant factors such as political and cultural affinities and benefits from joining the 
monetary union, we formulate the following hypothesis: if both demand and supply shocks 
are symmetric between the GCC countries and the US (core European countries), then the US 
Dollar (Euro) is qualified to be the suitable anchor. However, if, supply (demand) shocks are 
symmetric between the GCC countries and the US but demand (supply) shocks are 
symmetric between the GCC countries and the core European countries, then it may make 
sense for a basket with these two major currencies to be the appropriate anchor. The choice of 
an anchor here is only guided by the underlying principle that the costs of forming a currency 
union tend to be relatively small when shocks are synchronized across countries. In this vein, 
it is preferable for a country to adopt the currency of another country with which they share at 
least one common shock as opposed to none. 
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The methodology followed in this study draws from the works of Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1994), and Horvath and Rátfai (2004), who used bivariate structural vector autoregression 
(SVAR) of output growth and inflation identified with the long-run restrictions of Blanchard 
and Quah (1989). Analogously, these variables were computed using data on non-oil output, 
real gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP deflators for the period 1970–2008 from the 
United Nations Statistical Databases – National Accounts Main Aggregates. The SVARs 
used in the first part of this study include only non-oil GDP growth and inflation for the GCC 
countries, but for that of the prospective anchor countries, only data on real GDP were used.  
This estimated model can be regarded as the base model. Although non-oil GDP can be seen 
as a proxy for industrial production, there is no great loss of information from computing the 
correlation between shocks originating from SVARs with non-oil output growth and those 
emerging from real GDP growth. In this regard, the SVAR uses the long-run restriction that 
only non-oil supply (supply) shocks can have permanent effects on non-oil output (output) to 
identify our model.  
 
We performed estimations on a battery of SVAR specifications to test the robustness of the 
findings emerged from the base model: (a) we used short-run identification schemes, (b) we 
incorporated both oil output and non-oil output, and (c) we endogeneized the nominal/real oil 
prices along with non-oil output/total value added. Our results show, at the 5% significance 
level, that: (a) although demand as well as supply shocks are symmetric for core European 
countries, these shocks are mostly asymmetric with shocks affecting GCC countries; (b) GCC 
non-oil supply shocks are asymmetric with US supply shocks; (c) with the exception of the 
UAE, demand shocks are mostly symmetric between GCC countries and the US; and (d) on 
average, non-oil supply shocks as well as demand shocks are symmetric across GCC 
countries, with the latter showing a tighter link. Moreover, when the real price of oil enters 
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the SVARs, we find AD shocks to be symmetric, non-oil AS shocks to be mostly 
asymmetric, and oil AS shocks to be symmetric for all pairs of countries, but not for those 
involving Saudi Arabia.  These results clearly suggest that there are major adjustment costs 
involved for the GCC countries if they choose to anchor their new currency with the Euro. 
We concur with Khan (2009) that, despite the continuous decline vis-à-vis other currencies, 
the US dollar remains a better option for the GCC, since monetary policy from the US can at 
least smooth demand shocks for the GCC.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and Section 3 
discusses the theoretical foundations and the SVAR methodology followed by analyzing the 
data in details in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, while Section 6 deals 
with the conclusion of the paper.   
 
Section 2 Background 
Although the literature on the feasibility of monetary unions is in general quite developed, 
only a few studies have specifically paid attention to monetary union issues among GCC 
countries.  These studies typically emulate those of the EU and emphasis is often put on the 
convergence criteria4 as researchers weigh the costs against the benefits of these countries 
joining in a monetary union  (Khan , 2009; Sturm and Siegfried, 2005; Pattanaik, 2007; Dar 
and Presley, 2001; Jadresic, 2002; Iqbal and Fasano, 2003; Fasano and Schaechter, 2003; 
Fasano and Iqbal, 2002, 2003; Hebous, 2006; Laabas and Limam, 2002; Oman Economic 
Review, 2002; Ibrahim, 2004,). Sturm and Siegfried’s (2005) study is one of the most 
comprehensive works on the GCC countries. Their objective was to examine the similarity of 
economic structures across GCC countries. Their results show that these economies are 
                                                 
4 Namely, these studies compare inflation, real GDP growth, fiscal imbalances, tariff structures, current account 
balances, debt to GDP ratio, non-oil fiscal deficits, volume of intra-regional trade and movement in real 
effective exchange rate across countries. 
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indeed endowed with similar structures, and oil and gas represent a large share of their 
output. However, a considerable limitation of their study is that they fail to examine how the 
GCC reacts to macroeconomic shocks in their assessment of the viability of a monetary union 
between member countries. Similarly, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006) have done a through 
empirical analysis on the GCC economies to investigate the feasibility of a monetary union 
among these countries. They used bivariate SVARs of total output and prices (in natural log 
differences) identified with long-run restrictions to extract AD and AS shocks for the GCC 
countries. In their analysis, they used correlation, co-integration and common business cycle 
tests to determine the long-run movements in real output and the existence (or lack thereof) 
of common short-run cycles. Altogether, their analysis indicates that the transitory demand 
shocks are symmetric but the permanent supply shocks are asymmetric. Consequently, it is 
worth accentuating that their study did not find synchronous long-run and short-run 
movements in real output for these countries.  
 
Analogous to the other studies that focus on monetary integration issues among GCC 
countries, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn’s paper has two fundamental limitations in addition to 
Buiter's (2007) reservations on their use of long-run restrictions to identify the SVARs.  The 
first is the use of aggregate instead of disaggregate data.  The use of the aggregate data makes 
it problematic to disentangle symmetry from asymmetry of supply shocks when there is 
irrefutable evidence that the structure of the GCC economies is dichotomous in nature in that 
oil and non-oil output each account for approximately 50% of total output.  An inverse 
(positive) supply shock from the oil sector may accompany a positive (inverse) supply shock 
from the non-oil sector.  In such cases, it is the relative size of these shocks that can ascertain 
the general disturbance to the economy of each member country. Even though common 
beliefs point to these countries being subject to similar oil-related supply shocks, yet there is 
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no empirical evidence in the literature indicating that is the case for the non-oil sectors. For 
instance, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, p.10) noted that for countries where output is 
dominated by the oil sector (or other raw materials), a rise in the price of oil tends to increase 
total output (due to the boost in oil production) and finally AD (through the impact of oil 
revenues on real incomes). They therefore argued that it may be quite problematic for oil-
producing countries to distinguish between AD and AS shocks caused by a change in oil 
prices. 
 
The second limitation to Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn’s paper is that their empirical analysis 
does not explore the issue of currency anchor for the GCC countries, which is essential in the 
formation of the regional monetary integration. In the specific case of the GCC countries, it 
begs the question: is it indubitably an issue whether supply shocks are asymmetric if there are 
no other underlying objectives beyond the formation of a monetary union? Certainly, all the 
countries in the region except one have their currencies pegged to the US dollar already and 
whether external factors give rise to more serious supply shocks or not, the tools these 
countries currently possess to neutralize the effects of those shocks would be the same after 
forming the monetary union since they have decided from the outset to peg their unified 
currency to the US dollar. A more sensible approach, in our view, is to determine empirically 
whether the choice of the US dollar as the continued anchor is more apposite than the option 
of adopting the Euro, a market basket or a free float. Along this line, Khan (2009) only 
provides a situational analysis to back up his recommendation for the US dollar, whereas 
Jean-Louis et al. (2010) focused mainly on the correlation of impulse responses to monetary 
policy shocks between the GCC and the US to assert that the US dollar was a suitable anchor 
for the GCC currency. 
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This paper complements existing research in the literature and extends the study of Abu-
Bader and Abu-Qarn's in two ways. First, instead of using solely aggregate data, we 
disaggregate output into oil and non-oil. However, only the non-oil output is used in the base 
SVAR model for all the countries, which this allows us to capture the demand shocks that are 
likely to determine the impact of oil shocks on real incomes. We believe this approach is 
relatively new to the literature. We also estimate bivariate and trivariate models with both oil 
and non-oil output, total value added, and nominal and real oil prices. These models are 
identified with short-run restrictions to address the issue raised by Buiter (2007).  
Furthermore, along the lines of Horvath and Rátfai (2004), we used France, Germany and 
Italy as core European countries to assess whether supply and demand shocks from these 
countries are synchronized with those of the GCC countries, which could ultimately justify 
the feasibility of the Euro as an alternative anchor currency.  
   
 Section 3 Theory and Methodology 
The underlying theoretical framework of this paper is the aggregate demand (AD) and 
aggregate supply (AS) model.5 The short-run AS (SRAS) curve slopes upward, allowing for 
changes in AD to influence output. The long-run AS (LRAS) curve is vertical, denoting 
potential output and preventing AD shocks from having long-term real effects on the 
economy.6  The AD curve slopes downward. In a price-output space, full employment 
equilibrium is achieved when all three curves intersect at once. A positive supply shock shifts 
both AS and LRAS to the right, permanently giving rise to an increase in output and a 
decrease in price.  A positive demand shock, though permanent, can only affect output 
temporarily due to its impacts first on prices, then on real wages and other price-sensitive 
                                                 
5The diagram is not reproduced, here as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), and Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn 
(2006), because of space restrictions.  
6 However, once we allow AD shocks to have a permanent effect on the economy, the LRAS curve is no longer 
vertical but upward sloping with slope steeper than the SRAS curve. 
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determinants of AS. More precisely, this implies that output and prices move in the same 
direction when demand shocks hit the economy, and in opposite directions when subjected to 
supply shocks. However, actual data for GCC countries may not display these impulse 
response patterns, since these economies' output is largely dominated by oil production, the 
point made by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). In other words, for countries with oil as a 
large share of their output, an increase in oil prices also has real potential to insulate 
aggregate demand as oil revenues find their ways in other sectors and thereby increase real 
incomes. Since it might be "… difficult to distinguish between AS and AD shocks caused by 
a change in oil prices", impulse responses may be counter-intuitive or even misleading. 
 
For the base model, we use a bivariate SVAR model with the right-hand side variables being 
log differences of non-oil output 100 (∆yt) and log differences of prices 100 (∆pt). Each of 
these variables is driven by both a non-oil supply shock (est) and a demand shock (edt).  Using 
the lag operator L, the infinite moving average representation of the structural model can be 
represented as: 
 
The model is identified with the long-run restriction of Blanchard and Quah (1989). We 
therefore assume that only non-oil supply shocks can have long-run effects on non-oil output. 
This implies that the cumulative effects of demand shocks on the growth rate of non-oil 
output (∆yt) are zero, i.e.:  
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Since the SVAR methodology is standard in the literature, we do not provide further details 
regarding the procedures of extracting the unobserved structural shocks.7 Controversy also 
surrounds the interpretation of shocks with a permanent impact on output as supply 
disturbances, and shocks with temporary effects on output as demand innovations, as found 
in Buiter (2007). We address this issue by identifying alternative SVARs with short-run 
restrictions to test the robustness of our findings. More explicitly, we estimate the following 
models [∆xt, ∆yt, ∆pt]’, where xt is the natural log of either oil output, nominal oil price or real 
oil price, and yt is the natural log of either non-oil output or total value added when xt is either 
the nominal or real oil price. We also estimated a bivariate model with the natural log 
difference of total output and prices. In total, we estimated 60 SVAR models above and 
beyond the original 10 of the reference model. We assumed that oil output and oil prices 
(nominal or real) are the most exogenous of all the variables incorporated in the SVARs, 
which implies that only shocks to the oil sector can have contemporaneous effects on these 
two variables. Also, due to the inability of the non-oil sector or the overall economy to 
respond instantaneously to either positive or negative disturbances from the demand side, we 
did not allow AD shocks to influence non-oil output or total value added at impact. This 
assumption may lend itself to criticism since we have access to annual data, but there is 
always a price to pay when one simply wants to identify the models. The key to remember 
here is that we have allowed AD to have permanent effects on the GCC economy.   
 
Section 4 Data and Estimation 
The annual dataset used for the empirical analysis covers the period 1970–2008. The series 
includes: non-oil GDP in US dollars ,calculated as the total value added of all sectors except  
mining and quarrying; total value added or real GDP; and the GDP deflator with 1990 as the 
                                                 
7Iinterested readers may wish to consult Hamilton (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Enders (2004), and 
Amisano and Giannini (1997), among others. 
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base year because of the unavailability of consumer price index (CPI). All output data, valued 
in US dollars at constant 1990 prices along with the price level, were taken from United 
Nations Statistical Databases – National Accounts Main Aggregates. The monthly spot oil 
price data (West Texas Intermediate) were downloaded from the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average website and were then expressed in yearly averages prior to their conversion in real 
terms. We also extract data on the flows of imports and exports for the GCC member 
countries, the US, and the EU from the Direction of Trade Statistics database of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These data were used to ascertain the pace of economic 
integration among the GCC countries, and the relative importance of the US and the EU as 
trading partners for the GCC countries. Given the disparity in economic size of the GCC 
member countries, we take a typical GCC member country as one that can be represented as 
an average of the six economies. One can think of this as a fictitious country.   We 
constructed the non-oil output and GDP deflator variables for this representative country by 
taking the averages of the respective member countries' non-oil outputs and GDP deflators.8 
This enables us to have neither a too glowing nor a too gloomy picture of the GCC’s 
reactions to shocks from the US and Europe.9 The series was then tested for unit roots using 
the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF), the Dickey–Fuller Generalized Least Square (DF-
GLS) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, and were found to be integrated of order 1 or non-
stationary.10 Hence, the SVARs were estimated with the variables expressed in first natural 
log differences. 
 
Prior to the empirical estimation, we conducted a thorough analysis of the data to uncover 
any possible relationships among the variables. In Table 1, we present a breakdown of the 
                                                 
8 Although Saudi Arabia is the largest economy of all GCC countries and the remaining members differ in terms 
of economic sizes, we did not take a weighted average.  
9 This simulation was only conducted for the base model estimation. 
10 The unit root results are available upon request. 
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total output into the two components of oil and non-oil for each country and economic bloc, 
and the magnitude of each country/bloc relative to the US and the core European countries 
for the last five years of the data. For example, for the year 2008 (the end of the sample 
period), we find that non-oil output was $10.04 billion of a total of $11.74 billion for Bahrain 
(the smallest of the GCC countries) and $142.14 billion of a total of $205.39 billion for Saudi 
Arabia (the largest economy of the GCC). For the same year, the outputs of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were, respectively, 0.12%, 0.54%, 0.22%, 0.36%, 
2.18% and 1.07% relative to total US output, and 0.24%, 1.02%, 0.42%, 0.68%, 4.15% and 
2.03% relative to the core European countries. Table 1 is quite useful, as it enables us to rank 
the GCC members in importance for the union’s overall output and immediately establishes 
that the US economy is the largest of all. It also shows that non-oil output as a share of total 
output is in the 96–97% range for the US and within the 97–98% bracket for the core EU 
countries. This is in line with common understanding of the composition of the four major 
economies. It is also reassuring for us, since it ascertains that our approach to differentiate 
production into oil and non-oil makes intuitive sense.  
 
Although we could use Table 1 to infer the size of the oil and non-oil industry output as a 
share of US or core EU total output, in Figure 1, we present non-oil output as a share of total 
value added for the GCC members alone along with the data. This figure shows that Bahrain 
(with 79%) and the UAE (with 73%) have the largest non-oil sector of all for the 2000 
decade. From 41% for the 1970s to 65% in the 2000s, the trend towards expansion of the 
non-oil sector in the data is evident: save for Qatar, which shows declining trends due to the 
discovery of new gas deposits, most countries have shown significant progress towards 
economic diversification. The yearly data is plotted in Figure 2, which also contains the 
importance of the non-oil sector for the US, France, Germany and Italy. It shows that the oil 
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sector represents a negligible portion of their total output. Therefore, for these countries, there 
is indeed no great loss of information from using total output as opposed to non-oil output, 
though we did harmonize the choice of the variables the robustness section. 
 
We also looked into the linkages between the oil sector and the non-oil sector by conducting 
Granger non-causality tests across countries. We asked whether disturbances to nominal/real 
oil prices, oil/non-oil output and overall price levels are interconnected. To that effect, we 
computed the standard deviation for every pair of years and estimated an SVAR for each 
country. The tests were conducted on the SVAR coefficients and the results are reported in 
Table 2, which contains the probability that disturbances in a given variable can help explain 
disturbances in another or a group of variables. The lower triangles contain probabilities 
related to SVARs with nominal oil price volatility, whereas the upper triangles display 
probabilities for those with real oil price. At the 5% significance level, we only find two-way 
Granger causality between the oil output and the non-oil output for Kuwait and the UAE 
when nominal oil price volatility enters the SVARs, but only for Kuwait when real oil price 
volatility is included in the SVARs. The joint disturbances in all the variables explain 
innovations in non-oil output and overall prices for Bahrain; oil output and overall prices for 
Kuwait; oil output, non-oil output and overall prices for Oman and Saudi Arabia; non-oil 
output for Qatar; and nominal oil prices, oil output and non-oil output for the UAE. For 
Oman, Qatar and the UAE, the results do not change when real oil prices are taken into 
consideration. However, we observe that real oil prices for Bahrain (at the 5% level), real oil 
prices and non-oil output for Kuwait (at the 10% level) have become significant, while the 
joint effects on oil output are no longer significant for Saudi Arabia. Table 2 also indicates 
that GCC member countries, with the exception of Kuwait, do not individually influence the 
international market price of oil as demonstrated by the effects of innovations on oil and non-
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oil output. Overall, Table 2 establishes that these five variables (nominal/real oil price, oil 
output, non-oil output and overall prices) are important in assessing the costs of forming a 
monetary union, and therefore justifies our undertaking to estimate various SVAR 
specifications.11  
 
We carried out Granger non-causality tests using similar variables for the US, France, 
Germany and Italy, and present the results in Table 3. No two-way Granger non-causality 
was detected for any pairs. The joint effects of the variables are significant and explain, at the 
10% level, variations in oil prices, oil output, and overall prices for the US; non-oil output for 
France; all variables for Italy and none for Germany. These results hold irrespective of the 
measure of oil price considered.  We also looked into how volatility in oil output of the GCC 
member countries is linked to volatility in non-oil output of the four major countries. Table 4 
reveals that volatility in output of the GCC countries as a group causes (according to Granger 
non-casualty) non-oil output volatility in the US, France and Italy at the 5% level, and 
Germany at the 10% level. When the test was reversed, we found that combined fluctuations 
in economic activity of the non-oil sector of the US and the core EU countries give rise to 
volatility in oil output for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE at the 5% level, but not for 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which are major producers of oil and gas. When we count the 
number of significant correlations in Table 4 for the US (4) and take an average of the same 
for the three major EU countries (8/3 = 2.67), we find that the dollar is more dependent on 
the oil supplies of the GCC countries than the three EU countries. This is in line with the 
common understanding that the US economy is the largest in the world and therefore needs 
more energy to produce output. 
 
                                                 
11 We thank two anonymous referees for making the point that oil output and/or oil prices must be incorporated 
into the SVARs. We have followed this recommendation faithfully but have found no major deviations from the 
original results. 
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In Table 5, we consider export and import flows within the GCC region, between the GCC 
and the US, the EU and the remainder of the Middle East, namely Middle East/North Africa 
(MENA) non-GCC countries to assess the trade linkages and the extent of economic 
integration. Save for Kuwait, we observe that total trade with the US and with the GCC as a 
share of total trade with the world for each GCC country has declined when we compare the 
average of the first five years of the sample with the last five years, though the share of trade 
with the EU is far superior to that with the US. Therefore, the argument for the adoption of 
the Euro instead of the dollar cannot solely rest on trade integration between the EU and the 
GCC.  A number of events may be at the origin of the declining importance of the EU for the 
GCC: (1) the rise of Russia as a major oil exporter and its close proximity to other European 
nations, (2) the shift towards energy efficiency and the movement to protect the environment, 
and (3) the process of diversification of the GCC economies, which may have given rise to 
import substitution at home of certain products.  Table 5 also shows that total exports to the 
US as a share of world exports for Bahrain, Oman and the UAE have fallen, whereas those of 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have increased over the years. This tighter integration 
observed for the three countries may be attributed to the heavier military presence of the US.  
Exports to the EU as a share of total exports have increased for Bahrain only. In some cases, 
the fall is quite sharp, from 43.19% during 1980–1984 to 5.86% during 2005–2009 for Qatar.  
 
Without a doubt, total trade with the world for the GCC countries has increased substantially 
over the years. The growth for the two sample periods considered in some cases is in the 
vicinity of 400%. However, trade integration with the MENA non-GCC countries and within 
the GCC is at a standstill. Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar have seen their share of total exports 
decline, whereas Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recorded an increase in their exports 
to the MENAnon-GCC region. Within the GCC, we recorded an increase in the share of 
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exports to the other five member countries for Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but a 
decrease for Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. Of course, trade integration is only one aspect of 
economic integration, but the data do not support the claim that the GCC economies have 
become more integrated than ever.12  However, if it is true that countries with closer trade 
links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles, then the GCC patterns observed in 
Table 5 tend to suggest that Oman and Saudi Arabia are more likely to have their business 
cycles synchronized and therefore are suitable candidates for monetary union, as per Frankel 
and Rose’s (1998) endogeneity of OCA criteria. 
  
      An analysis of the data used in the base model estimation is shown in Table 6, which 
reports the mean and standard deviations for real non-oil output growth and inflation for all 
GCC countries, the US and the three core European countries. It shows that all the GCC 
countries have experienced higher growth and higher inflation rates than the US and the 
European countries. However, when volatilities are considered, their non-oil output growth is 
at least three times less stable than that of the US and the European countries. Inflation 
appears to follow a similar pattern but with a smaller gap in relative variability compared to 
the selected European countries. The same holds for the average of the GCC bloc, while the 
US is by far the most stable economy on all accounts. This table indicates that a move of the 
GCC countries away from the US dollar as their principal anchor currency towards the Euro 
is a move from a low to a high inflation shelter, which is suboptimal, since there is no 
accompanying gain in employment.13 
 
Table 6 about here 
                                                 
12 One may still claim that we should have used total trade, as we did for the US and the EU, to make this point, 
but there is no need because the import of one country is the export of another country within the same group. 
13 All GCC countries import foreign labor from the rest of the world. The short-run Phillips curve prediction of a 
tradeoff between unemployment and inflation may not hold for these countries.  
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Table 7 presents the cross-country correlations of GCC real non-oil output growth with the 
USA and core European countries. We could only find two significant positive co-
movements in non-oil output growth: Bahrain with France and Bahrain with Italy. These 
might be due to Bahrain’s status as an offshore country. Overall, the GCC countries' non-oil 
output is not correlated with either the US or the three European countries. Tables 3–8 depict 
the cross-correlations of inflation. It shows that inflation in all GCC countries, save the UAE, 
is significantly correlated with US inflation, which is not surprising because of the long 
history of these countries’ national currencies being pegged to the US dollar. But the same 
cannot be said in relation to the European countries. Not a single correlation is significant.  
Again, there is no gain for GCC countries to switch to the Euro, despite the tighter trade 
linkages with Europe.   
  
Table 7 about here 
Table 8 about here 
 
Table 9 summarizes the cross-country correlations of real non-oil output and inflation among 
GCC countries. With the exception of the UAE, where a significant co-movement is detected 
with only Bahrain and Qatar, inflation is significantly correlated among member countries. 
We are able to uncover only two positively significant correlations when we look into output 
linkages: Qatar with Bahrain and the UAE with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, non-oil output 
growth is mostly not correlated among GCC countries.   
   
Table 9 about here 
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Section 5  Empirical Results 
The Base Model 
In this section, we present results pertaining to the estimation of a bivariate SVAR with non-
oil output growth and inflation for each of the 10 countries, in line with the common belief or 
assumption that oil shocks affect the GCC countries in a similar fashion. We estimated the 
SVARs with two lags even though the optimal lag length recommended for some countries 
was higher in some cases. According to Enders (2004), OLS estimates are asymptotically 
efficient and consistent, provided that the independent variables are the same in each 
equation. We extracted the AD and AS shocks for each country, and computed their bilateral 
correlations. A positive correlation indicates symmetry while a negative correlation indicates 
asymmetry of shocks. Emphasis is put mostly on correlations that are statistically significant. 
 
Table 10 presents the correlation of  the GCC non-oil supply shocks with overall supply 
shocks from the US and the core European countries. We also explore the correlation of 
supply shocks between the core European countries to test whether our SVAR models are 
capable of producing results similar to those of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). We report 
a stronger statistically significant correlation of supply shocks at the 5% level: 0.90 for 
France with Germany; 0.85 for France with Italy and 0.81 for Germany with Italy.14 
Surprisingly, we could only detect two significant correlations of supply shocks between 
GCC countries and the core European countries at the 10% level: Qatar displaying symmetry 
with France and the UAE exhibiting asymmetry with France. Supply shocks are categorically 
asymmetric between US and GCC countries. This can be explained by the fact that oil shock 
is a large component of supply shocks in the US and in Europe, while it is mostly a demand 
shock for GCC countries (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994).  
                                                 
14 It appears that 13 years of data since the publication of Bayoumi and Eichengreen's work have made a great 
difference but this is also a sign that economic integration has contributed to the synchronization of the countries 
in response to disturbances. 
 25
 
Table 10 about here 
 
Table 11 presents the correlation coefficients of demand shocks. It shows that the three 
European countries respond similarly to demand disturbances but they are not synchronized 
with GCC countries. A different picture, however, emerges in relation with the US. With the 
exception of the UAE, demand shocks are mostly symmetric between GCC countries and the 
US. These relationships are statistically significant. Moreover, when we consider the average 
of the GCC bloc the same relationships resurface, suggesting that monetary policy from the 
US at least can serve the purpose of the GCC countries. Unfortunately, the same cannot be 
said for European monetary policy on the basis of what we could infer from the three major 
EU members.  
 
Table 11 about here 
 
In Table 12, we report the correlations of both supply and demand shocks among GCC 
countries. We place the correlation coefficients for supply shocks on the upper triangle while 
those of demand shocks are on the lower one. Demand shocks are mostly symmetrical among 
GCC countries. Twelve (80%) of the 15 coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The UAE's links with Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia are non-significant. 
These results are, by and large, consistent with those of Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006). 
However, there is no overwhelming support of their conclusion that supply shocks are mostly 
asymmetric; hence, their stance on the readiness of the Gulf countries to form a monetary 
union. Six (40%) of the possible 15 pairwise correlations are positive and statistically 
significant, while only one of the coefficients (UAE–Bahrain, -0.47) is significantly negative. 
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Interestingly enough, Saudi Arabia, which has the largest economy, shares common non-oil 
supply shocks with all GCC countries except the UAE.15 Percentage-wise, we cannot 
conclude that non-oil supply shocks – and to that effect, supply shocks – are asymmetric 
under the assumption that oil shocks affect these countries in a similar way. Nevertheless, we 
shall acknowledge a tighter relationship between the GCC countries in response to demand 
shocks.  
 
Table 12 about here 
 
To summarize, our results thus far indicate that:  
(1) The Euro may not be the appropriate anchor for GCC countries because of shock 
asymmetry.  
(2) Despite the US's misfortune lately, the dollar remains the best option for pegging the 
individual GCC currencies and the expected single currency to. The US currency can 
at least help five of the six countries, including the largest economy of the region, in 
smoothing demand shocks.  
(3) The member country that is to be most concerned about the monetary union with the 
rest should be the UAE, not Oman. The UAE appears to be on a path of its own. 
(4) GCC countries are, on average, subject to similar shocks and are therefore good 
candidates for monetary union. They are all reliant on oil and have channeled 
substantial portions of their oil revenues, at differing degrees, towards development in 
infrastructure, manufacturing, and services. Although this is reassuring, when we 
                                                 
15  The discrepancy between the correlation of non-oil output growth results and responses to shocks is an 
anomaly of the data also found in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) for the case of correlating Canada with the 
United States. In their case, they had used quarterly data as an alternative to confirm their findings, but in our 
case, we cannot because such data are not available. 
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consider these countries have a common language, religion and culture in general, 
labor mobility remains one of the major hurdles in combating asymmetric shocks.  
 
Further Discussion 
 
In this section, we present results pertaining to a variety of SVAR specifications to test the 
robustness of the base model findings. The assumption that GCC countries react similarly to 
oil shocks was relaxed to incorporate either the oil output or the nominal or the real oil price 
as a third variable. Also, we addressed the issue related to the use of the real GDP for the 
possible anchor countries and non-oil output for the GCC.  In SVAR models where we 
differentiated between oil and non-oil output, the same variables were used for all countries. 
The same applies for cases where total value added had to be used.  
The rationale for estimating some SVARs with nominal oil price and others with real oil 
price is because of the unsettled debate in the literature. For example, Hamilton (1996, 2003), 
and Hamilton and Herrera (2004) used a nominal net oil price increase measure, whereas 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Kilian (2008a, 2008b, 2009), and Herrera and Pesavento 
(2009) used the real price of oil in their SVARs to gauge the effects of oil shocks on key 
macroeconomic variables. We used these two approaches to broaden the scope of our work 
and thereby cover all grounds.  
 
Prior to considering models with oil output or nominal/real oil prices, we estimated a 
bivariate SVAR with the growth of total value added and inflation for each country. The 
results presented in Table 13 support our earlier findings that AD shocks are symmetric 
across GCC countries and between the GCC and the US, but not between the GCC and core 
EU countries. There is no evidence of AS shock symmetry, with four statistically significant 
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pairs of both positive and negative correlations for the GCC. However, we find positive 
correlations of AS shocks with the US for all GCC members, three of which are significant: 
US–Bahrain, US–Kuwait and US–Qatar. The average significant correlation pairs between 
the GCC and the core EU countries is two, suggesting that the GCC would be better off in 
adopting the US dollar over the Euro. Table 13 also shows that both AD shocks and AS 
shocks are symmetric across the European countries, but their AD shocks are asymmetric but 
the AS shocks are symmetric with the US. 
 
Table 14 supplies the results related to SVARs estimated with the growth of oil output, non-
oil output and prices. It confirms our earlier finding with respect to AD shock symmetry, but 
also hints that non-oil as well as oil AS supply shocks are not symmetric. For the former, nine 
of the 15 correlation pairs are positive but only two are significant, whereas for the latter, 
only four pairs are significant for the GCC countries. Although we have more positive than 
negative correlations, this is not strong enough evidence of symmetry. In this case, we find 
evidence that neither the US nor the core EU countries are subjected to similar non-oil or oil 
AS shocks.   
 
Table 15 investigates the impact on the linkages between the set of countries when 
nominal/real oil price replaces oil output in the SVAR model. We use a lower and upper 
triangular structure to summarize the results for SVARs with nominal and real oil prices, 
respectively. The symmetry of AD shocks documented earlier is now even stronger. There is 
no support for non-oil AS shock symmetry within the GCC, or between the GCC and the 
potential anchor countries. However, when we analyze the correlations of oil AS supply 
shocks, we find that 40% of them are positive and statistically significant for the SVARs with 
nominal oil price when compared to 67% for the SVARs with the real oil price. Moreover, 
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we find statistically significant positive oil AS shock correlations between the GCC and the 
four major countries. With the exception of Saudi Arabia where oil AS shocks are 
asymmetric with most countries, this finding overall does not defy common knowledge, and 
therefore tends to suggest that previous research on the costs of monetary union for the GCC 
countries may have suffered from problems of model mis-specification if the real oil price 
does not enter the SVAR. This might be the reason why Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006) 
found that AS shocks are asymmetric between the GCC countries, as demonstrated by the 
outcomes of the various SVARs estimated in this paper. When we repeated the estimation of 
the model by replacing the non-oil output with the total value added, as presented in Table 
16, the results remained the same except that Saudi Arabia now displays positive correlations 
that are not statistically significant with most countries. In neither of these two models is 
there evidence of a tighter linkage between the core EU countries and the GCC, compared to 
between the GCC and the US, to support any claim that the Euro is more suitable than the US 
dollar as anchor for the GCC currency.   Overall, this new finding tends to suggest that 
SVARs with the real price of oil are more suitable for capturing the dynamics of shocks 
underlying the business cycles of the GCC countries. 
 
   
Section 6 Conclusion  
Our objective in this paper was to assess the feasibility of monetary union between the GCC 
countries and the choice of either the US dollar or the Euro as an anchor for the proposed 
unified currency of the GCC. Our focus was primarily on the costs of forming  a monetary 
union using the contribution of Mundell (1961) as a springboard in determining whether 
macroeconomic shocks across member countries are symmetrical and whether there is any 
synchronization of those shocks with the US and the three core European countries, namely 
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France, Germany and Italy.  Our hypotheses were formulated as follows: if both demand and 
supply shocks were symmetric between the GCC countries and the US (core European 
countries), then the US Dollar (Euro) would be qualified as the suitable anchor. However, if, 
say, supply (demand) shocks were symmetric between the GCC countries and the US but 
demand (supply) shocks were symmetric between the GCC countries and the core European 
countries, then it would make sense for a basket with these two major currencies to be the 
appropriate anchor.  
The paper follows closely the works of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), and Horvath and 
Rátfai (2004), and employs the SVAR technique to extract the structural shocks. Two sets of 
SVAR models were estimated: one we term the base model and another one, which we used 
to assess the robustness of the findings. The base SVAR models were just identified with the 
long-run restrictions of Blanchard and Quah (1989) that demand shocks have no long-run 
effects on non-oil output. The results show that: (a) AD shocks are unequivocally 
symmetrical but non-oil AS shocks are weakly symmetrical across GCC countries, thereby 
suggesting a monetary union is feasible, though not overwhelmingly; (b) neither AD nor AS 
shocks are symmetrical between GCC countries and the selected European countries; (c) the 
GCC's AD shocks are symmetrical with the US but non-oil AS shocks are not. We therefore 
surmise that the US dollar is a more appropriate candidate for the new currency than the 
Euro, since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in GCC countries. 
This is the conclusion reached partially from the cross-correlation analysis on non-oil output 
growth and inflation. These results also hold when we consider the average of the GCC bloc. 
 
The second set of SVAR models was comprised of bivariate and trivariate models with 
combinations of oil, non-oil output, total value added, nominal and real oil prices, and the 
overall price level in natural log differences. These models were just identified with the short-
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run restrictions ofSims (1992) to address the concerns raised by Buiter (2007) and to assess 
whether our results were sensitive to the use of non-oil output as opposed to total output, or 
whether there were mis-specification problems in the SVAR models for not incorporating oil 
output or the price of oil in the initial analysis. We find overwhelming support for AD shock 
symmetry across the GCC countries and between the GCC countries and the US, but none for 
the three major EU countries with the GCC. Non-oil AS shocks are mostly asymmetric for 
all, but oil AS shocks are mostly symmetric when the real price of oil enters the SVARs.  
This finding is in line with the common view that GCC countries must be subjected to 
common oil shocks. It also suggests that previous SVAR models estimated to pass judgment 
on the feasibility of monetary union across GCC countries may have suffered from mis-
specification if the real price of oil was not taken into consideration. This might the reason 
underlying Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn’s (2006) finding that AS shocks were asymmetric 
between the GCC countries, though other flaws, such as the failure to decompose total output 
into oil and non-oil outputs and the unreliability of their dataset, which came from various 
sources with differing sample sizes, were noted in their paper.   
 
It is also worth emphasizing that of the 70 SVAR models estimated, we could not find any 
instance where business cycle linkages between the three EU countries and the GCC 
dominate those of the US with the GCC.  Trade linkages between the EU and the GCC 
cannot be used as an argument for the Euro over the US dollar as an anchor, though the 
GCC’s trade with the EU is greater than trade with the US as a share of their total trade. The 
main reason is that the GCC’s share of total trade with the EU has been declining quite 
drastically over recent years. Therefore, our findings from the base model that AD shocks are 
symmetric but AS shocks are weakly symmetric, and that the US dollar is a more appropriate 
anchor for the new GCC currency, sit on firm grounds.  
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In summary, this paper has contributed to the debate on the anchor currency by providing 
statistical evidence to GCC decision makers who have been wrestling with the dilemma of 
whether to revalue or to de-peg their actual currencies. We are also aware that our finding 
that US monetary policy can at least help contain demand shocks affecting GCC economies is 
debatable. Many believe that imported inflation resulting from the depreciation of the US 
dollar lately has worsened the inflation problem in these countries. We have, however, two 
arguments in response: (1) imported inflation is temporary and is a negligible share of total 
inflation; and (2) as the GCC economies are gearing towards more diversification, the 
depreciation of the dollar has the potential to boost exports and improve current account 
balances, as long as they do not rely too heavily on imported raw materials and intermediate 
goods. The problem of inflation in GCC countries is mostly due to rent and food prices. A 
better solution is for governments to release the pressure on the prices of land they control 
and the fees they charge to developers so that rentals can become more affordable, though the 
recent financial and housing crisis originating in the US has already done part of the job. Our 
paper therefore hints that de-pegging or revaluing the respective currencies to curb inflation 
will not accomplish much and the choice of the Euro instead does not guarantee a better 
outcome, despite these countries' closer trade links with Europe. Moreover, although we rely 
solely on the dynamics of macroeconomic shocks to suggest that a monetary union is feasible 
among the GCC countries, labor mobility and the level of intraregional trade remain some of 
the issues that they must address if they want to reap the full benefit of the union. 
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